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EFFECTS OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PARTIES ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS CONTRACTS
Louis C. James*
II.

C

CASE ANALYSIS

OMMENT HAVING BEEN MADE

regarding the several problems and

solutions relating to the central core of this thesis,' it is
proposed, in this section to discuss some of the cases bearing upon
the matter of usury, and the more specialized problems to be
found in the carrier and the insurance contracts. These cases
will, at least partially, answer two questions, to-wit: (1) what law
may the parties choose to govern their contract, and (2) what are
the limitations on party autonomy in conflict-of-laws contracts?
It should be noted at the outset, however, that concern will be
limited to the point of formal or essential validity of the contract
so made and will not reach into extraneous matters.
A.

THE EFFECT TO BE GIVEN TO USURY

1. The General Rule
A court will, in general, accept as the governing law of the
contract the law of that state with which the contracting parties
intended to contract' but it may refuse to enforce a contract which
* B.S., LL. B., University of Virginia, M.A., LL. M., Columbia University. Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington D. C.
1 See, in particular, the first part of this article appearing ante in 36 CHICAGO KENT LAw REVIEW 34-59 (1959).
2 This point is discussed ante, 36 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 35, at note 6,
where it was indicated that the limitations on the presumed intent of the parties
seem to be more or less similar to the limitations on the expressed intent. In the
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it deems to be against its own public policy. Use of the public
policy of the forum has, in turn, its own limitations; also the
forum may refuse to enforce the contract if a policy determinant
of the law of a place having the most vital or natural connection,
as seen by the forum, with an essential element of the contract is
in conflict with the law chosen by the parties. 3 Usually, then,
there seems to be little doubt, if the spatial contacts of the contract
are either the place of making or the place of performance of the
contract, that the courts will uphold the agreement, subject to
the exceptions mentioned.4
To illustrate, in the Massachusetts case of Akers v. Demond,5
a note bearing interest at the rate of ten per cent was made in
New York but was to be paid in Texas. The note was usurious if
the law of New York was to be applied but was valid if the law of
Texas was to be used. If the court adhered rigidly to the placecase of Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] App. Cas. 277
at 290, for example, the court states that "intention is objectively ascertained, and,
if not expressed, will be presumed from the terms of the contract and the relevant
surrounding circumstances." The author of a note in 21 Col. L. Rev. 585, at 588-9,
indicates that, in all intent cases, the first question to ask pertains to good faith.
In response to the question as to what is the test of good faith, he says we must
"revert to our general principles. What jurisdiction did the parties intend should
govern? This intention will be respected, unless an additional intention existsan intention to evade the usury laws." The author cites Andrews v. Pond, 38
U. S. (13 Pet.) 65, 10 L. Ed. 61 (1839).
3 Annotations may be found in 125 A. L. R. 482, 112 A. L. R. 124, and L. R. A.
1916D 750. Cases bearing on the point include O'Toole v. Meysenburg, 251 F. 191
(1918), cert. den. 248 U. S. 583, 39 S. Ct. 136, 63 L. Ed. 432 (1919); Personal
Finance Co. v. Gibson, 26 Ala. App. 18, 152 So. 462 (1933), cert. den. 228 Ala. 107,
152 So. 466 (1933); Jackson v. American Mort. Co., 88 Ga. 756, 15 S. E. 812
(1892) ; Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N. Car. 511, 157 S. E. 860 (1931) ;
Jenkins v. Union Savings Ass'n, 132 Minn. 19, 155 N. W. 765 (1916); Smith v.
Parsons, 55 Minn. 520, 57 N. W. 311 (1893) ; Crawford v. Seattle R. & S. R. Co.,
86 Wash. 628, 150 P. 1155 (1915).
For other material, see Nutting, "Suggested
Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 196 (1935), and notes
in 33 Col. L. Rev. 508 and 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1178. Arguments based on a denial
of due process and full faith and credit have been made in such cases as Order of
United Comm'l Travelers of Amer. v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586, 67 S. Ct. 1355 (1947) ;
John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129 (1936) ; Hartford
Ace. & Ind. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634 (1934);
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571 (1932) ; Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338 (1930). In 33 Col. L. Rev. 508 at 514,
public policy is referred to as an "amazing shifty phenomenon."
4 In addition to the annotations listed in note 3, ante, see also 62 L. R. A. 33,
and the cases of Locknane v. United States Say. & Loan Co., 103 Ky. 265, 44
S. W. 977 (1898) ; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Mullan, 107 Md. 457, 69 A. 385 (1908),
an insurance case; Stoddard v. Thomas, 60 Pa. Super. 177 (1915); and Manufacturers Fin. Co. v. B. L. Johnson & Co., 15 Tenn. App. 236 (1931).
5 103 Mass. 318 (1869).
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of-making rule,6 the note would be invalid. However, if it followed
the place-of-performance rule,7 the note would be valid. The
Massachusetts court concluded that the question of validity had to
be determined by the law of the state of making, saying no other
law could apply to the note. As the note had never acquired a
legal existence there, the note was void in every other state. In
the usury cases, however, there is also a tendency on the part of
courts to uphold the contract in the interest of commerce 8 which
often causes a considerable number of them to sustain a given
transaction provided it may be upheld under either the internal
law of the place of performance or of the place of making,' or by
the law of some state with which the transaction can be said to
have had its most natural or vital connection. 10
2. The Stipulated Law
The desire to uphold the contract may cause the court, as in
Dugan v. Lewis," to permit the validation of the contract provided
the interest rate is not usurious by either the law of the debtor's
domicil or the lender's domicil, 2 or where the stipulated law is
the law of the situs of the land which is the security for the note,
6 Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws (Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1951),
2d Ed., pp. 239-40.
7 Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N. Car. 511, 157 S. E. 860 (1931).
8 Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867).
9 Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 298, 17 L. Ed. 540 (1864). See also Seeman
v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 403, 47 S. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927).
State cases may be found in American Freehold Land Mort. Co., v. Sewall, 92
Ala. 163, 9 So. 143, 13 L. R. A. 299 (1890); Smith v. Brokaw, 174 Ark. 609,
297 S. W. 1031 (1927); Mueller v. Ober, 172 Minn. 349, 215 N. W. 781 (1927);
Davis v. Collins, 137 Misc. 396, 241 N. Y. S. 76 (1930).
10 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 403, 47 S. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed.
1123 (1928) ; Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229, L. R. A.
1916D 739 (1914).
1179 Tex. 246, 14 S. W. 1024, 12 L. R. A. 93, 23 Am. St. Rep. 332 (1891).
The
same rationale has been followed in Merchants' & Manufacturers' Sec. Co. v.
Johnson, 69 F. (2d) 940 (1934), cert. den. 293 U. S. 569, 55 S. Ct. 91, 79 L. Ed.
668 (1934) ; Smith v. Parsons, 55 Minn. 520, 57 N. W. 311 (1893) ; Le Sueur v.
Manufacturers' Finance Co., 285 F. 490 (1922) ; Ashurst v. Ashurst, 119 Ala. 219,
24 So. 760 (1898) ; Castelman v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 171 Miss. 291, 156 So.
648 (1934).
12 Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co., 88 F. (2d) 449 (1937) ; Steinman v. Midland
Savings & Loan Co., 78 Kan. 479, 96 P. 860 (1908) ; Midland Savings & Loan Co. v.
Solomon, 71 Kan. 185, 79 P. 1077 (1905) ; Townsend v. Riley, 46 N. H. 300 (1865);
Goode v. Colorado Invest. Loan Co., 16 N. Mex. 461, 117 P. 856 (1911).
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as in the case of Lanier v. Union Mortgage Banking & Trust Company.'3 Nevertheless, several usury cases have held the stipulations of the parties to be void because the referral law was in
14
conflict with that of the forum.
Turning to a more detailed analysis of what the courts have
said and done in the usury situations, attention might first be
drawn to the Kansas case of Midland Savings & Loan Company v.
Solomon 15 where the court held that the parties to the contract
could stipulate that their contract should be governed by the laws
of a state of their choice. It concluded that, if the stipulation was
made fairly and in good faith," it would be the duty of the courts
of any other state, in which litigation growing out of the contract
arose, to permit recovery on the bond and thus to give effect to
the stipulation. In that case, the contract had contact with the
state of Colorado, whose law was expressly chosen to govern the
transaction, for the building and loan association lender was a
Colorado association and payment of the debt was to be made
there. While the mortgaged security for the loan was located in
Kansas; the suit was brought in Kansas; the mortgagor was a
13 64

Ark. 39, 40 S. W. 466 (1897).
14 Falls v. U. S. Savings, Loan & Bldg. Co., 97 Ala. 417, 13 So. 25, 24 L. R. A.
174 (1892) ; Fidelity Savings Ass'n v. Shea, 6 Ida. 405, 55 P. 1022 (1899) ; Snyder
v. Fidelity Savings Ass'n, 23 Utah 291, 64 P. 870 (1901) ; Floyd v. National Loan &
Invest. Co., 49 W. Va. 327, 38 S. E. 653 (1901). For similar case holdings, see
Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F. (2d) 730 (1930), cert. den. 282 U. S. 897,
51 S. Ct. 182, 75 L. Ed. 790 (1931); United Divers Supply Co. v. Commercial
Credit Co., 289 F. 316 (1923); Locknane v. U. S. Savings & L. Co., 103 Ky. 265,
44 S. W. 977 (1898); U. S. Savings & L. Co. v. Scott, 98 Ky. 695. 34 S. W. 235
(1896); Building & L. Ass'n of Dakota v. Bilan, 59 Neb. 458 (1899); Bundy v.
Commercial Credit Co., 200 N. Car. 511, 157 S. E. 860 (1931) ; Meroney v. Atlanta
Bldg. & Loan Assn. 116 N. Car. 882, 21 S. E. 924 (1895).
15 71 Kan. 185, 79 P. 1077 (1905).
16 See the concept of "good faith" portrayed in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse
Co., 274 U. S. 403, 47 S. Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927), and in Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229 (1914).
A note in 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 647, at 650, suggests that "good faith . . . apparently means no more than
that the stipulated law has some relation to the contract."
See also note in
10 N. Car. L. Rev. 64, and the holdings in Ripple v. Mortgage Corporation, 193
N. Car. 422, 137 S. E. 156 (1927) ; Morris v. Hockaday, 94 N. Car. 286 (1886);
Houston v. Potts, 64 N. Car. 33 (1870) ; Roberts v. McNeeley, 52 N. Car. 506
(1860) ; Arrington v. Gee, 27 N. Car. 590 (1845) ; Crawford v. Seattle R. & S. R.
Co., 86 Wash. 628, 150 P. 1155 (1915). Bad faith must not be evident before the
court If the parties' intent Is to be fulfilled: Fidelity Say. Asso. v. Shea, 6 Ida.
405, 55 P. 1022 (1899) ; Meroney v. Atlanta Bldg. & L. Asso., 116 N. Car. 882, 21
S. E. 927, 47 Am. St. Rep. 841 (1895); Stoddard v. Thomas, 60 Pa. Super. 177
(1915).
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resident of Kansas; and the mortgage was acknowledged in
Kansas; the petition in the action alleged that the bonds and
mortgage were delivered to the plaintiff in Colorado. Since an
instrument is deemed made where delivery occurs, Colorado was,
in essence, both the place of making and the place of performance
of the contract.
In the course of its opinion, the court stated:
The contract having been made in Colorado, and the sums due
upon it having been made payable there, the presumption of
law is that it is solvable in that state. That presumption how-,
ever, is a rebuttable one, and, if nothing further appeared,
the court would have the right to take into consideration extraneous facts in ascertaining the true intention of the parties.
But an express provision of the contract makes it subject to,
and entitled to the benefits of, the laws of Colorado. Presumably, the parties knew what they desired, and understood
the force of the language they used; and, having agreed in
writing, further inquiry, except, of course, for fraud and
the like, is precluded. The contract must be adjudged by the
express terms, no matter where the parties were when it was
made . . . Where . . . the parties to the contract have themselves expressly declared that their contract shall be held
and construed as made with reference to a certain jurisdiction,
that shows by what law they intended the transaction to be
17
governed.
Citing Chief Justice Marshall as authority for the fact that a
contract is to be governed by the law with reference to which it
is made,"8 the Kansas court pointed to the fact that there was no
room for inference or presumption as to what that intention was
17 71 Kan. 185 at 187, 79 P. 1077 at 1078. The court quoted from Philmore, 4
Int. Law 469, to the effect that it "is always to be remembered that in obligations
it is the will of the contracting parties, and not the law, which fixes the place of
fulfillment whether that place be fixed by express words or by tacit implicationas the place of the jurisdiction to which the contracting parties elected to submit
themselves."
18 Waymon v. Southard, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 1 at 48, 6 L. Ed. 253 at 264 (1825).
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when it was expressed in the contract,1 9 so it then examined the
contract in question for any evidence of an evasion of usury laws
and found none.
The court also expressed itself on the role that public policy
should play in cases of this nature when it said:
The courts of this state should not refuse, on the ground of a
supposed public policy, to enforce collections of sums on a
lawful bond solvable by the laws of a foreign state, and not
given in evasion of the usury laws of this state, merely because, if construed by the laws of this state, the rate of interest would be higher than that allowed by the laws here.2"
The court, having observed that presumptions are all in favor of
the legality of contracts and of the "good faith" of the parties to
them,2 1 expressed the belief that the Colorado law chosen by the
parties had, in the eyes of the forum, a most vital and natural
connection with essential elements of the transaction, so it upheld
and enforced the stipulations of the parties.
In a later Kansas case, that of Steinman v. Midland Savings
& Loan Company,22 the expressed stipulations in the contract were
similar in nature to those in the case last mentioned. The same
Colorado building and loan association had issued to Steinman a
certificate for shares of its capital stock for which he had agreed
to pay them a stipulated amount monthly. Steinman then obtained
a loan on the strength of these shares from the loan company but
later made default thereon. When suit in Kansas on this loan
followed, questions of usury and of the pertinence of the express
stipulation in the contract that the law of Colorado should govern
the transaction arose. Again, the interest rate was valid by
Colorado law, but invalid by the law of Kansas. Once more, the
court found that the contract was made in Colorado; that there
19 The court relied on Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 1 S. Ct. 102, 27 L. Ed.
104 (1882), and Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 94 Va. 146, 26 S. E. 421, 36
L. R. A. 271, 64 Am. St. Rep. 715 (1896).
20 71 Kan. 185 at 190-1, 79 P. 1077 at 1079.
21 Ibid.

22 78 Kan. 479, 96 P. 860 (1908).
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had been no attempted evasion of usury laws; that "good faith"
existed in the entire transaction; and that there was no evidence
of fraud or the imposition of the will of the lender upon that of
the borrower. Giving judgment for the lender, the court added
the cautionary remark that if "our citizens choose to apply for
loans to corporations in other states, no fraudulent scheme or
evasion being pleaded or proven, they must abide by their agreement that the laws of that state shall govern in such matters. "
A slightly different approach is manifested in the Tennessee
case of ManufacturersFinance Company v. B. L. Johnson & Company,4 where it was held that, for an express stipulation of the law
of a state for the governance of the transaction to be upheld, the
transaction had to have some vital connection with the state whose
law had been chosen to govern the transaction. Delaware, the
state referred to, was neither the place of making nor the place
of performance of the contract. It is true that the court found
that the corporation making the loan was chartered in Delaware,
but its principal address was Maryland and the loan was made to
a Tennessee corporation. The court found that the offer was
accepted in Maryland and the performance was to be in Maryland
and in Tennessee, so the court felt inclined to view the Maryland
law as having more essential contacts with the contract than the
law of any other place, hence it governed the contract on the point
as to usury. It is interesting to observe that the contract rate of
interest was valid in Maryland and in Delaware, but invalid in
Tennessee. It would have been most interesting to observe what
the court would have done had the Maryland and Tennessee laws
both rendered the contract rate of interest usurious and only the
Delaware law would have rendered the contract valid.
At best, with as little reasoning as we have from the court
for its decision, the opinion seems somewhat dogmatic. Certainly,
Delaware, where the corporation was chartered and had its domicil, had a connection with the transaction. The question remains,
what is the most vital or natural connection of contract elements?
23 78 Kan. 479 at 482-3, 96 P. 860 at 861.
24 15 Tenn. App. 236 (1931).
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What are the essential elements of a contract? Who is to make
the decision on these issues other than the forum? Are all forums
in agreement on these issues? If they are not, and they certainly
are not, does not the use of the "most vital or natural contact"
theory leave much to be desired in the way of uniformity in the
conflict of laws as to contracts? Must we not pause and ask, would
it not be better, on the whole, to let the parties accomplish this
uniformity by the use of their expressly stipulated law?
By way of contrast, turn to the federal court decision in the
case of Brierley v. Commercial Credit Company.2 5 It was there
held, in relation to a contract made in Maryland for the loan of
money by a Maryland corporation to a Pennsylvania corporation,
that a stipulation to the effect that the law of Delaware should
govern the validity, enforcement, interpretation, construction, and
effect of the agreement, was not effective in determining whether
the reserved interest was usurious because Delaware was said to
have had no normal relations with the transaction.
The significance to be given to the "contact theory" of validity is well illustrated by the Arkansas case of Lanier v. Union
Mortgage Banking & Trust Company.2 6 A stipulation there contained in a trust deed of real property located in Arkansas recited
that the trust deed should be construed in accordance with the
laws of that state where the deed of trust was madeIT The provision was found to be binding on the parties, and subjected the contract to the laws of Arkansas with respect to usury, in spite of
the fact that the deed of trust and the note were both executed in
Tennessee by a resident of Arkansas who was, at the time, in
Tennessee and the note was payable in New York. The court reasoned that as Lanier was a resident of Arkansas; the land used
as security was located there; and the money from the loan was to
be used in Arkansas; the law of Arkansas should apply since it
had the most vital contact relationship with the entire transaction.
2543 F. (2d) 730 (1930).
26 64 Ark. 39, 40 S. W. 466 (1897).
27 The trust deed recited that it was "made" in Arkansas.
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Somewhat comparable holdings have been achieved in two
2
other real estate lending situations. In Smith v. Parsons, 8 validity
and effect was given to an express stipulation that the notes were
made and executed under, and were to be construed by the Minnesota law, in a case where the makers of the notes were residents of
Minnesota; the notes were secured by a mortgage on real estate
in Minnesota; and the instruments were signed in Minnesota; although the notes were accepted and the money actually advanced
in Connecticut, where the notes were payable. In Ashurst v.
Ashurst,29 the land given in security for the loan was located in
Alabama, and the notes and mortgage, executed in Alabama, were
forwarded to the agent of the borrower in New York. The agent
delivered the papers to the loan company in New York and there
received the money, which he later transmitted to the mortgagor
in Alabama. The mortgage contained a provision waiving exemptions under the laws and constitution of Alabama. Further, the
stipulation in the contract indicated that the mortgage and notes
were to be governed by the laws of Alabama even though the notes
were payable in New York. The court held that this was an
Alabama contract.8 0
In still another case, that of Washington National Building
& Loan Association v. Pifer,3 ' the usurious character of a loan
transaction made by a Virginia corporation which had its principal
offices in the District of Columbia to a resident of West Virginia,
where the land security for the loan was located, was said not to
be controlled by the laws of Virginia, since Virginia was neither
the place of making nor the place of performance of the agreement.
This result was achieved despite the fact the contract expressly
55 Minn. 520, 57 N. W. 311 (1893).
29 119 Ala. 219, 24 So. 760 (1898).
30 It is often most difficult to be certain what effect the stipulated intent had
upon the decision of the court. See Leffilar, Conflict of Laws (U. of Ark. Press,
Fayetteville, Ark., 1938), § 93; Pollard, "Conflict of Laws-Usurious Contracts,"
4 Ark. L. Rev. 88 (1949). On the effect to be given to a stipulated intent in general, see note in 69 Harv. L. Rev. 563 commenting on the more recent case of
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F. (2d) 189 (1955), not, of course, a
usury case. An earlier note in 62 Harv. L. Rev. 647 suggests that, in the usury
cases, the courts "favored commerce by a marked hostility toward invalidation."
8131 App. D. C. 434, 14 Ann. Cas. 734 (1908).
28
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provided that it should be governed by the laws of Virginia. Possibly, the decisive factor in the court's ruling was its desire to
assist, by the use of its own law, what it seems to have considered
to be an oppressed borrower who did not have economic equality in
dealing with the corporation. In any event, the court, in essence,
treated the lending corporation as a corporation domiciled in the
District of Columbia even though it was incorporated in Virginia.
Only a very insignificant ratio, however, of court decisions
since 1902 have rejected the stipulated law of the parties and,
even in these decisions, the law adopted by the bench was that of
the place wherein the lender had its principal office. In four more
recent decisions, that choice resulted in sustaining the contract, as
the stipulated law itself would have done. 2
B.

THE CARRIER CONTRACT CASES

1. GeneralRules
Usually, the intention of the parties, either expressed 33 or presumed,3 4 is the ultimate criterion of the governing law for conflictof-laws carrier contracts. The law chosen to govern the contract
35
must, of course, not conflict with the public policy of the forum,
32 See the cases of Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F. (2d) 730 (1930);
Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N. Car. 511, 157 S. E. 860 (1931) ; Stoddard
v. Thomas, 60 Pa. Super. 177 (1915); and Manufacturers Finance Co. v. B. L.
Johnson & Co., 15 Tenn. App. 236 (1932), where the court rejected a reference to
Delaware law but followed the references to the law of Maryland. Rabel, The
Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, Vol. 2, p. 410, sets forth a listing of some
26 American usury cases, in 12 of which the stipulation was followed. See also
Big Four Mills, Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Co., 307 Ky. 612, 211 S. W. (2d) 831
(1948).
33 Textual treatment on the point appears in Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty
Law (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1939) ; Knauth.
The American Law of
Ocean Bills of Lading (American Maritime Cases, Baltimore, 1953), 4th Ed., and
Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2. Leading articles include Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the
Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws," 49 Col. L. Rev. 1027 (1940) ; Levy, "Chief
Justice Shaw, and the Formative Period of American Railroad Law," 51 Col. L.
Rev. 327, 852 (1951) ; Allen, "Limitations of Liability of Passengers by Air Carriers," 2 J. Air Law 325 (1931). A series of notes may be found in 31 Col. L. Rev.
495, 10 Minn. L. Rev. 530, 7 Mod. L. Rev. 75, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 635, 58 W. Va. L.
Rev. 83, and 35 Yale L. Rev. 997.
34 In addition to annotations in 112 A. L. R. 124, 72 A. L. R. 250, 57 A. L. R. 175,
63 L. R. A. 513, and 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, see 9 Am. Jur., Carriers, §§ 385, 660-1.
35 The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102, 46 L. Ed. 190 (1902) ; Siegelman
v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F. (2d) 189 (1955); Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F. (2d) 724 (1925) ; The Fri, 154 F. 333 (1907) ; Monroe v. The
Iowa, 50 F. 561 (1892) ; Hathaway v. The Brantford City, 29 F. 373 (1886) ; The
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nor with the public policy of a place having the most vital or natural
connection with an essential element of the transaction, 6 as viewed
by the forum. Nevertheless, as observed in the usury cases, use
by the forum of its own public policy has certain constitutional
limitations.
Two brief illustrations will serve the purpose. In the case of
Liverpool & Great Western Steam Company v. Phenix Insurance
Company, 7 the contract of shipment involved a voyage from New
York to Liverpool. There was no express stipulation in the contract as to the governing law. The court took the view that the
proper law governing the contract was that of the place where the
agreement was made and the transportation begun unless it was
made to appear that the parties, "when entering into the contract,
intended to be bound by the law of some other country. "3 However, in that case, the court arrived at the conclusion that the contract was an American one so it gave effect to the rule of American
public policy invalidating provisions in an agreement designed to
limit the liability of the carrier. The vital and substantial contacts
of the transaction, as the court saw it were in America where the
contract was made and where part performance began.
The second case, that of Pittsburgh,Cincinnati,Chicago & St.
Louis Railway Company v. Sheppard, 9 was one in which the court
used the rule of the place of destination as the basic reason to invalidate the carrier's attempted limitations on liability. Although
the transportation began and the contract was made in another
Energia, 56 F. 124 (1893) ; Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knutsen, 94 F. Supp. 60
(1951); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gardiner, 51 Neb. 70, 70 N. W. 508 (1897);
Compania De Inversiones Int. v. Industrial Mtge. Bank of Finland, 269 N. Y. 22,
198 N. E. 617 (1935); Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N. Y. 244,
194 N. E. 692 (1935); Vladikavkssy Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189
N. E. 456 (1934); Petrogradsky Mejddunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National
City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930) ; Frenkel & Co. v. L'Urbaine Fire Ins.
Co., 251 N. Y. 243, 167 N. E. 430 (1929) ; Meacham v. Jamestown R. R. Co., 211
N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (1914) ; Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works, Inc., 172
S. W. (2d) 812 (Tenn. App., 1943) ; Cartens Packing Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co.,
58 Wash. 239, 108 P. 613 (1910).
36 Northern P. R. R. Co. v. Kempton, 138 F. 992 (1905) ; Cartens Packing Co. v.
Southern Pac. R. Co., 58 Wash. 239, 108 P. 613 (1910).
37 Sub. nom., The Montana, 129 U. S. 397, 9 S. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788 (1889).
38 129 U. S. 397 at 458, 9 S. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788 at 798.
39 56 Ohio St. 68, 46 N. E. 61, 60 Am. St. Rep. 732, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 517 (1897).
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state where it would have been valid, the court referred the contract to the law of the place of destination as the sole place of performance for its governance and, by that law, it was invalid.
Other courts have regarded the contract as divisible into as
many parts as there may be nations or states in which any part
of the transportation takes place. Accordingly, reference has been
made to the law of the particular place where the loss or damage
40
occurred as furnishing the governing law.
It should be borne in mind, however, that shipments from a
foreign nation to the United States, or from the United States to
a foreign nation, or between the United States and any of its territories or possessions, are subject to the terms of certain federal
statutes such as the Harter Act, 41 and the statute relating to the
carriage of goods by sea,4 2 hence agreements with respect thereto
must not be contrary to the public policy evinced by such statutes.
In addition, if there is a conflict between strong policy determinants
of a forum which has some natural, vital or substantial contact with
the transaction and the exemption limitations of a contract which
is the subject of any of these acts, the exemption provisions will
43
not be enforced in the United States.
40 In particular, see Southern Exp. Co. v. Gibbs, 155 Ala. 303, 46 So. 465, 18
L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, 130 Am. St. Rep. 24 (1908).
For further case comment on
interstate shipments and applicable law, see Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. C. C. Whitnack Produce Co., 258 U. S. 369, 42 S. Ct. 328, 66 L. Ed. 665 (1922); Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 S. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268 (1903); Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 S. Ct. 151, 28 L. Ed. 717 (1884).
41 27 Stat. at L. 445, U. S. C., Tit. 46, § 190.
Knauth, op. cit., p. 122, suggests
that the statute "must derive its constitutional authority from the admiralty
clause, because it applies in domestic commerce to transactions which are not Interstate but merely maritime." For a study of the early history of ocean bills of
lading, with special reference to American participation, see Knauth, op. cit., pp.
115-32. No distinct American practice existed until the United States Supreme Court
made the error of excusing a railroad from responsibility for the issuance of a
fraudulent bill of lading by its agent on the basis of ultra vires: Friedlander v. T.
& P. 1I. R. Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 S. Ct. 570, 32 L. Ed. 991 (1889). In the northern
states, Union Uniform Bills of Lading thereafter came into being, but were not
followed In the Gulf states until 1916, with the enactment of the Pomerene Act.
For the present American public policy in this area, see Knauth, op. cit., pp. 115-56,
and Robinson, op. cit. In English and Continental courts, contracts of exoneration
of shipowners for nearly every fault under the sun were valid.
42 49 Stat. at L. 1207-13; U. S. C. Tit. 46, §§ 1300-1915.
43 See Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 21 S. Ct. 30, 45 L. Ed. 90
(1900) ; The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, 19 S. Ct. 491, 43 L. Ed. 801 (1899) ; The
Silvia, 171 U. S. 462, 19 S. Ct. 7, 43 L. Ed. 241 (1898).
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2. StipulatedLimitations and Governing Law
Any detailed analysis of the carrier contract cases could best
begin with the case of Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Limited.4
The plaintiff and his wife had there contracted in New York with
the defendant, a British corporation, to secure sea transportation
for them to a foreign port. During the course of the trip, the wife
was injured by the alleged negligence of the defendant. The
printed contract on the reverse side of the ticket stipulated that
all claims for injury were to be brought within one year from their
occurrence and that any questions arising from the contract were
to be decided according to the English law. Before the end of the
one-year limitation period, the defendant's New York agent purported to waive the limitation period by oral agreement. Promptly
upon the expiration of the period of limitation, however, the defendant withdrew an offer of settlement it had previously made
and denied liability. In the court actions which followed, it was
held, applying the federal choice-of-law rule, that by referring the
contract to English law governance, the parties intended to invoke
English substantive law rather than English law in its entirety, including its conflict-of-laws rule, and that the purported waiver or
45
estoppel did not apply under English law.
Although the law controlling the validity of the contract was
44 221 F. (2d) 189 (1955).
While the case did not actually involve the validity
of contract, the court said the problem before It was very close to a validity case
and reasoned much the same for either. A note on the case appearing in 58 W. Va.
L. Rev. 83 says there are "certain limitations on the parties' privilege to stipulate
the applicable law . . . The stipulation must be bona fide . . . The place stipulated must have some relationship to the contract . . . The stipulation must be
one which will neither allow the parties to do some act or fail to do some act
which would violate, nor allow the parties to do some act or fail to do some
act which would evade or avoid, any statute of the place of contracting . . . In
summary. no such provision will be given effect where it Is regarded as violative
of the ordre public."
46 For the rule to be applied in admiralty cases on the question as to whether
state or federal law should apply, see Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S.
239, 63 S. Ct. 246, 87 L. Ed. 239 (1942), and Jensson v. Swedish American Line, 185
F. (2d) 212 (1950). For English cases on expressed intent of the parties and the
governing law, see Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760), where
a gambling transaction was involved; Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 Q. B. 589
(1884); Trinidad S. & T. Co. v. G. R. Alston & Co., [19201 A. C. 888; Vita Food
Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A. C. 277. American cases on
expressed Intent are noted in Beale, Conflict of Laws (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New
York, 1935), Vol. 2, pp. 1118-74.
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not in issue, the court found it very closely related to the points
actually in issue in the case and said:
Here, of course, the question is neither one of interpretation
nor one of validity, but instead involves the circumstances
under which parties may be said to have partially rescinded
their agreements, or to be barred from enforcing them. The
question is, however, more akin to a question of validity.
Nevertheless, we see no harm in letting the parties' intention
control . . . Instead of viewing the parties as usurping the
legislative function, it seems more realistic to regard them as
relieving the courts of the problem of resolving a question of
conflict of laws. Their course might be expected to reduce
litigation, and is to be commended as much as good draftsmanship which relieves courts of problems of resolving ambiguities. To say that there may be no reduction in litigation because courts may not honor the provision is to reason backwards. A tendency toward certainty in commercial transactions should be encouraged by the courts. Furthermore,
in England, where much of the litigation on these contracts
might be expected to arise, the parties' stipulation would
probably be respected. 6
It then proceeded to examine into whether or not there had been
good faith on the part of the parties, i.e., whether the law chosen
by the parties was in conflict with policy determinants of a place
having the most vital or natural connection with some essential
element of the transaction, and as to whether there was any intent
to evade or avoid the law of America in their choice of law. Finding no violation present, the court then observed that, although in
England the parties' stipulated law would, most likely, be followed
by the English courts, there was no evidence to indicate that in
England the parties, making these stipulations with carriers, were
in any manner oppressed. Instead, it found that the primary reason for making the stipulations in question was to promote uniformity in contract relations, a factor "often hailed as the chief
46 221 F. (2d)

189 at 195.
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objective of the conflict of laws" since it served to promote "ad47
ministrative simplicity" in the law.
Turn next to a triad of cases in which, though the choice-oflaw problem did not arise since the courts there concerned presumed an intent from what the parties .did and from the surrounding circumstances, it is possible to draw a natural inference of
what the courts would have done had they been faced with an
expressly stipulated intent of the parties. In the first case, that
of Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Company," the issue arose out of
a ticket, treated as a contract, covering a voyage from Liverpool
to Boston which contained provisions exempting the carrier from
liability, even for negligence. The court observed that since the
contract was valid where made, i.e., in England, and the plaintiff's
acquiescence to it under the conditions being deemed equivalent to
an express assent, and since it was neither illegal nor immoral,
the court could see no reason for not enforcing it in Massachusetts,
even though a similar contract, if made in Massachusetts, would
have been void as against the local public policy.
The second case, that of 0'Regan v. Cunard Steamship Company,49 was similar in character except that the contract was one
made in Ireland for a passage from Ireland to Massachusetts.
A stipulation relieving the carrier from liability for injuries due
to negligence of the company's servants, clearly opposed to the
public policy of Massachusetts if the contract had been made in
that state, was upheld as being valid where made. Again, the
court could find nothing inherently illegal or immoral in such
stipulations, provided they were entered into elsewhere than in
the jurisdiction where the court sat.
0 the court
In the third of these cases, one entitled The Fri,5
stated that it recognized that, by the federal decisions, a stipula47 The reference to "administrative simplicity" seems more nearly tied to the
fact that, because of the express stipulation, the company was under an obligation
to train its employees in only one set of legal rules rather than in many sets.
48 153 Mass. 553, 27 N. E. 665, 12 L. R. A. 340, 25 Am. St. Rep. 660 (1891).
49 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070 (1894).
50154 F. 333 (1907), cert den. 210 U. S. 431, 28 S. Ct. 761, 52 L. Ed. 1135 (1908).
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tion which exempted a carrier from liability for negligence in a
contract made abroad and to be performed in the United States
would be contrary to public policy in the United States, hence
would be treated as unenforcible even though it might be valid
by the law of the place of making. Nevertheless, the court was
of the opinion that as to the particular contract before it, one
made in the United States of Colombia for a trip to a point in
Cuba, which was clearly valid under the laws of Colombia, there
was no reason for applying an American public policy to produce
an invalidation of the contract.
It may be observed that in each of these cases the court was
not adverse to the use by the parties of an express stipulation
as to the governing law of the contract as long as the law so
chosen had a reasonable connection with some spatial contact,
viewed by the court as the most vital or most natural contact, of
the contract. American public policy was to be used only when
that which the court viewed as the most vital or natural contact
4 an essential element of the contract was an American one. A
reasonable interpretation of what the court did, therefore, in each
case, and what it indirectly indicated it would do if the parties
had expressly chosen a law to govern their contractual relations,
places these cases in support of the use of the "expressed intention" theory, although the law chosen by the parties must, as
the cases indicate, have some reasonable connection with a spatial
contact of the transaction which the court would view as the
most vital or natural. Until many of our courts awaken to the
universal requirement of uniformity in conflict-of-laws contract
norms, and until they recognize that balancing economic and social
bargaining values may be arrived at by other means than by denying the parties to contracts their freedom to choose their own law,
it is likely that we may still linger under some of the adverse
,effects of "the most vital and natural connection" theory. This
-will be so because all reasonable men, and judges are not essenti-ally different here, do not arrive at the same or identical "vital
and natural connections" with regard to any given contract elemert
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For illustration of this fact, one could turn to the Illinois case
of Delta Bag Company v. Frederick Leyland & Company."' In
that case, the court seemed to view its own public policy so
strongly as to condemn stipulations in the carrier's contract even
though the stipulations were valid where made and Illinois had
no connection with the transaction except that it happened to be
the place where the suit was brought, for the contract in question
embraced a shipment between Liverpool and New Orleans. It is
possible, however, to find a reason for the court's action in that
no direct proof was offered as to the law of either England or
Louisiana. In such a situation, it would not be unreasonable for
the court to incline toward the presumption that the law of these
places would be the same as that of Illinois for a local contract.
By contrast, mention could be made of at least five cases wherein
the contract, valid both where made and to be performed, was
said not to be negated by some contrary public policy of an
American forum. 2
Public policy can, without question, have a powerful effect
for, in the case of Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Corcoran,53 the court refused to enforce an exemption-from-negligence
stipulation of the carrier on the ground of public policy even
though the contract stipulated that all questions arising from the
contract were to be governed by English law, by which law the
51173 Ill. App. 38 (1912).
52 Thus, in the case of the Miguel Di Larrinaga, 217 F. 678 (1914), involving a
contract made in Liverpool covering transportation to Cuba and containing customary negligence exemption clauses, the contract was upheld despite an opposing
American policy. The case of The Trinacria, 42 F. 863 (1890), achieved a similar
result under a contract valid where made as well as where the loss occurred, even
though the ultimate destination of the shipment was New York. In Baetjer v.
La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 59 F. 789 (1894), on facts practically identical with the case last mentioned, stipulations against negligence on the part of
the carrier were sustained. The case of Shelton v. Canadian Northern R. Co., 189
F. 153 (1911), differs from the others only in the fact that the injured plaintiff
was accompanying his cattle between points in Canada under a free pass which
stipulated against liability for negligence. Strongest of all is the case of Coats v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 239 Ill. 154, 87 N. E. 929 (1909), where at least a minor
point of contact between the contract and the state of the forum existed in the
fact that the shipment was delivered to a connecting carrier within that state.
Nevertheless, a stipulation limiting liability was upheld because valid where made
and to be performed, despite a strong contrary public policy of the forum. See also
Cohn v. Adams Exp. Co., 170 Ill. App. 174 (1912) ; Elbaum v. Southern R. Co., 168
Ill. App. 66 (1912) ; Atland v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 151 Ill. App. 291 (1909).
539 F. (2d) 724 (1925).
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contract was valid. A possible explanation for the view taken
by the court in this case may lie in the fact the contract was made
in the United States, where it was invalid, although it called for
passage from Montreal to Liverpool, with no part of the trip
taking place within the United States. It could be said, as to
still other cases wherein stipulations limiting liability were rejected,5" that at least part of the transportation or performance
under the contract took place within the jurisdiction of the United
States, or within the state whose public policy was enforced, so
as to support resort to the public policy of the forum.
55
One illustration may be found in the case of The Kensington,
arising under a steamship ticket from Antwerp to New York which
contained a stipulation sharply restricting the carrier's liability. 56
There was no proof specially tending to show that at the time the
ticket was issued the attention of the traveller was called to the
fact that the ticket embodied exceptional stipulations relieving
the company from liability, or that such conditions were agreed
to. The court found the ticket exemptions were void by the rule
of the forum's public policy. Justification for this result might
be found in the fact there was to be at least part performance
within the United States as it was the country to which the steamer
and her passengers were directed.
54 See the cases of The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102, 46 L. Ed. 190
(1902) ; The Guildhall, 58 F. 796 (1893), aff. in 64 F. 867 (1894) ; The Hugo, 57 F.
403 (1893); Lewisohn v. National S. S. Co., 56 F. 602 (1893) ; The Energia, 56 F.
124 (1893) ; The Iowa, 50 F. 561 (1892) ; and The Brantford City, 29 F. 373 (1886).
Some of these cases are discussed below. In addition thereto, see The New England,
110 F. 415 (1901); The Glenmavis, 69 F. 472 (1895) ; Adams Exp. Co. v. Mallichamp, 138 Ga. 443, 75 S. E. 596 (1912); Southern Exp. Co. v. Hanaw, 134 Ga. 445,
67 S. E. 944, 137 Am. St. Rep. 227 (1910); Lake Shore & Mich. So. R. Co. v. Teeters,
166 Ind. 338, 77 N. E. 599 (1906) ; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gardiner, 51 Neb. 70, 70
N. W. 508 (1897).
55 183 U. S. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102, 46 L. Ed. 190 (1902).
56 Liability for harm was purportedly conditioned by the following words, printed
on the ticket, to-wit: "The shipowner ...

is not . . . liable for loss, death, injury,

or delay to the passenger . . . arising from the act of God, the public enemies, fire,
robbers, thieves of whatever kind, whether on board the steamer or not, perils of
the sea, rivers or navigation, accidents to or of machinery, boilers or steam, collisions, strikes, arrest or restraint of princes, courts of law, rulers or people, or from
any act, neglect or default of the shipowner's servants, whether on board the
steamer or not or on board any other vessel belonging to the shipowner, either in
matters aforesaid or otherwise howsoever." Other restrictive language applied to
the passenger's baggage.
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In another case, that of The Brantford City,57 the shipment
was to go from Boston to England under a contract found to have
been made in the United States. In fact, the stowage of the
goods, consisting of cattle, was wholly performed in Boston before
the ship started on its trip. It is true that the navigation was to
be chiefly performed on the high seas with delivery to be made
in England, but the court was able to find that the negligence which
caused the damage arose in the United States as well as on the
high seas. With the major contacts of the transaction, except for
delivery, occurring within the jurisdiction of the United States, it
is understandable why the court should have felt that American
public policy should prevail.
Something of the converse of the last mentioned situation is
revealed in the case of F. A. Straus & Company Inc. v. Canadian
Pacific Railway Company.55 The contract there concerned was
made in Shanghai to transport silk to New York. Included therein
was the usual stipulation for exemption from negligence59 together
with a declaration that the contract was to be construed according
to British law. The goods were to be routed by way of a Canadian
steamer to Vancouver, B. C., and thence by the defendant's railway car to New York. The loss occurred before the silk ever got
to Vancouver. In the light of the several British contacts with
the transaction, it would be supposed the contract, valid by British
law, would have been enforced. But the suit was conducted in
New York; the purchaser corporation was a New York concern;
and New York was also the place for delivery. After considering
the entire transaction, the court decided that New York law should
govern and thus the stipulations were held invalid. Possibly,
the court was more interested in protecting its own residents
and citizens than in making a proper choice of law but at least
there were some important contacts of the transaction with New
York.
57 29 F. 373 (1886).
58254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930).
59 In the case of Compania De Navigacion La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 18
S. Ct. 12, 42 L. Ed. 398 (1897), the court observed the presence of gross negligence
on the part of the carrier. It indicated that no stipulation could be considered as
made to cover a default of this nature.
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No discussion of this subject should overlook the case of E.
Gerli & Co., Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Company,60 one where the
contract of carriage had been made in Italy for the delivery of
goods in New York. The goods went by rail from Italy to France,
by boat to Southampton, and thence by boat to New York. Two
bales of merchandise were missing on arrival in New York. The
bill of lading contained an express stipulation that the contract
was to be governed by English law and purported to limit recovery
to a stated sum for each package, unless some greater value had
The court found that the
been declared and extra freight paid.'
bill was drawn and delivered in Italy and that Italian law would
normally govern the contract. It then went on to utter its famous
dictum to the effect that "an agreement is not a contract, except
as the law says it shall be and to try to make it one is to pull on
one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation, and the
parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no more than with
62
whether their acts are torts or crimes."
Since the Italian law was not established, the court construed
the terms of the agreement in order to arrive at a decision. The
court observed that, in Italy, an agreement of carriage creates
obligations generally measured by the language used. In that
connection, it stated: "Prima facie, the agreement is a contract;
he who maintains that in a given situation it is not, must prove the
law of Italy. The libellant has not proved it, and he must lose."
On this basis, the court gave a decision for the minimum amount
stated in the bill of lading. Such decisions lend credence to the
observations of some authorities that judges may, at times, decide
a case from a "hunch. ' 63 To put it mildly, Professor Nussbaum
considers the case as "isolated." 64
6048 F. (2d) 115 (1931).
61 The British Carriage of Goods Act, art. III, sec. 6, provides that no clause in
a bill of lading shall "lessen" the "liability" of a carrier except as the act allows.
Section 5 of art. IV of the statute may, arguendo, be assumed to forbid anything
below 100 pounds, English money, per package. The bill here concerned purported
to limit recovery to 20 pounds per package: 48 F. (2d) 115 at 117.
62 48 F. (2d) 115 at 117.
63 See comments on "legal realism" in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1951), pp. 655-60.
64 Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement," 51 Yale
See also Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the
L. J. 893, at 897, note 25 (1942).
Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws," 49 Yale L. J. 1027, at 1034, notes 41-44

(1940).
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Whenever a contract could be considered immoral or illegal
under some strong public policy of the forum and there are some
vital contacts of the transaction with the forum, at least as viewed
by the forum, the courts thereof will be likely to refuse to enforce
the agreement. 5 This may not, however, always be the case, witness
the holding in the case of Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
Louis Railway Company v. Druien.66 The common carrier involved in that case contracted in Illinois to carry freight into
Kentucky. The contract was designed to relieve the carrier from
liability for damages brought about by fire not arising from the
negligence of the carrier. This common-law limitation was valid
in Illinois but invalid in Kentucky. The freight, while in transit
in Illinois to Kentucky, was destroyed by accidental fire. In an
action brought in Kentucky, the shipper contended that the provisions of the Constitution of Kentucky, where suit was brought and
where delivery was to be made, provided the most emphatic indication possible of the public policy of that state on that subject,
to-wit: that no contract to carry freight in the state could limit the
common-law liability of the carrier with respect thereto, regardless where made. He even insisted that a contract by a common
carrier to carry freight anywhere, even if made and to be executed
entirely outside of the state, provided liability under it was to be
enforced in the state, would not be upheld in the face of the public
policy forbidding enforcement if to do so would be to limit the
common law liability.
The court, citing several of the cases used by the plaintiff,
nevertheless proceeded to its own conclusion that the limitation
clause amounted to a valid defense. In that connection, it said
it did not regard the cases to go so far as to say, or even to inti65
1n Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 at 268-9, 26 L. Ed. 539 at 543 (1880),
the United States Supreme Court said: "Whenever the illegality of the contract
appears . . . the disclosure is fatal . . . A stipulation in the most solemn form to
waive an objection would be tainted with the vice of the original contract, and void
for the same reasons . . . The principle to be extracted from the cases is, that
the law will not lend its support to a claim founded upon its violation." The case
involved a matter of bribery rather than the carriage of goods. The court found
the agreement to be so strongly against a United States public policy that it stated
that even if the contract were made in Turkey and valid there it would not be
enforced in the United States.
66 118 Ky. 237, 80 S. W. 778 (1904).
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mate, that if the breach of a valid contract made in a foreign
country had occurred there, so that the liability of the carrier had
been both initiated and consummated there, that then the provisions of the contract would have to be rejected in a suit brought
upon the contract in the courts of the United States, even though
such provisions were against the public policy of the United States.
Rather, it was of the opinion that the public policy of a state was
necessarily
confined to the regulation of its own affairs and transactions
occurring within its sovereignty. No state can be said to have
a public policy as to the administration of justice, or as to
the service of quasi-public agencies, or as to contracts made
with respect thereto, transpiring wholly abroad. The public
policy of a state can no more have extra-territorial effect than
67
can a statute of the state.
C.

THE INSURANCE CONTRACT CASES

1. General Rules
As in the carrier cases, so in suits based on insurance contracts, provided the parties have expressly stipulated the law to
govern the transaction, that law will usually be sustained by the
forum6 unless it is contrary to the public policy of the forum6 9
67 118 Ky. 237 at 247-8, 80 S. W. 780 at 781.
68 Annotations appear in 112 A. L. R. 124, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 275, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 968, and 63 L. R. A. 833. Leading articles include Fallon, "Conflict of Laws
in Insurance," 1 J. Am. Soc. Chart. Underwriters 344 (1947) ; Schoenbach, "Capacity
of Minors and the Conflict of Laws," 17 Bost. U. L. Rev. 623 (1937) ; Ehrenzweig,
"Adhesion Contracts and the Conflict of Laws," 53 Col. L. Rev. 1072 (1953)
Cheatham and Reese, "Choice of the Applicable Law," 52 Col. L. Rev. 959 (1952);
Goodrich, "Yielding Place to New: Rest versus Motion in the Conflict of Laws," 50
Col. L. Rev. 881 (1950) ; Fallon, "Conflict Theories and Life Insurance Settlements,"
1951 Ins. L. J. 22; Morris, "The Eclipse of Lem Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 505 (1953) ; Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories of Contracts:
Cases versus Restatement," 51 Yale L. J. 893 (1942) ; and Nussbaum, "Public Policy
and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws," 49 Yale L. J. 1027 (1940). Notes
appear in 25 Ford. L. Rev. 130, 24 Ford. L. Rev. 268, 17 Ind. L. J. 247, 3 Mercer L.
Rev. 346, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1178, 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 692, and 25 Tulane L. Rev. 290.
For more information, see Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 304-47, and Stumberg, op. cit.,
pp. 224-79. In the case of Jansson v. Swedish American Lines, 185 F. (2d) 212
at 219 (1950), the court said: "In the infinite variety of circumstances presenting
choice of law problems relating to contracts, it Is safe to say that there is no
simple and dependable rule of thumb by which the choice may be unerringly made."
69 Of course, all the theories are subject to the policy limitations imposed by the
forum: Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, 245 U. S. 412, 38 S. Ct. 147. 62 L. Ed. 368
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or such stipulation, as viewed by the forum, is contrary to the
public policy of the law of the place most substantially connected
with an essential element of the transaction."0 Again, as observed
in the usury cases, 71 the use by the forum of its public policy concepts has certain constitutional limitations but there is a tendency
to uphold those contracts which are beneficial to the insured and
to reject those which are against the interests of the insured. 2
In addition to these general propositions, and particularly
with respect to insurance contracts, other doctrines have been invoked. Thus, a general rule appears to exist in some of the states
to consider state statutes, at least those of the state in which the
insurance contract was made, as being a part of the contract. One
concerned with the controlling laws may not overlook this rule,
because it may serve to override those rules which ordinarily
78
would apply in the choice of law.
In some insurance cases one can find the rule laid down that
the law of the place of making the contract governs. 74 In that
connection, it is the general rule of conflict of laws that a contract
valid where made, or valid at the place of performance, is en(1918) ; Campittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A. (2d) 669 (1947); National
Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Burch, 124 Mich. 57, 82 N. W. 837 (1900); Personal
Fin. Co. of Council Bluffs v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 225 N. W. 558 (1934).
As to constitutional limitations, see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 45
S. Ct. 129, 69 L. Ed. 342 (1924), and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 S.
Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832 (1897). Also see notes in 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1178 and 34 Tex.
L. Rev. 114.
70 In addition to the material set out in note 68, ante, see an excellent comment
in 10 La. L. Rev. 346. The absence of a "contact" will probably lead to disregard
of the governing-law stipulation: Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R. I.
162, 192 A. 158 (1937).
See also Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New, York, 224
N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918), where Cardozo, J., uses "common sense" in his
approach to the issue.
71 See note 3 ante, at p. 88 hereof.
72 In fact, the author has been unable to find a case in which the agreement was
upheld, in a stipulated choice of law situation, wherein the insured's interests would
have been damaged by the upholding of the stipulation.
73 Fallon, "Conflict of Laws in Insurance," 1 J. Am. Soc. Chart. Underwriters 344
(1947), cites the case of Smith v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 232 Mo. App. 935,
107 S. W. (2d) 191 (1937).
See also National Life Ins. Co. v. Wolverton, 163
S. W. (2d) 654 (Tex. Civ. App., 1942).
74 The place of making of the contract is usually said to be the place where it
is delivered, unless the parties' stipulations are honored and they have chosen some
other place. Absent proof as to this, there is a presumption that delivery was at
the insured's residence: Pierkowskie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 F. (2d) 928
(1944).
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forcible in the state of the forum even though the contract would
not have been enforced there in the first instance if it had been
made or was performable there.7 5 Accordingly, the substantive
law of the state where the insurance contract is made and delivered
will prevail over the law of the forum,"6 subject to the exception
that no legal right will be enforced which will contravene the
public policy of the forum. 77 For this purpose, it is often said
that a federal court sitting in a state cannot enforce a rule of
law which is contrary to the public policy of the state in which it
78

sits.

In the fraternal benefit society cases, 7 9 by contrast, the court
may look to the law of the place of incorporation of the society for
the governing law in the contract. The theory behind this rule
seems to be that questions which arise under this type of policy
pertain more nearly to a common fund and should, therefore, be
governed, for administrative ease and uniformity, by a law of some
place which has a collective interest in the whole of the fund.
Some discussions seem to indicate that the court may look to
the law of the place of performance as well as to the law of the
place of making as the governing law in insurance contracts. If
75

Goodrich, op. cit., §§ 106-7, 109-10; Stumberg, op. cit., pp. 226-41.

76 Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Ruby, 219 Ark. 729, 244 S. W. (2d) 491 (1951).

See
also Faude, "Conflict of Laws Applied to Automobile Insurance," (1950) Ins. L. J.
818. Although the action is brought in the federal court rather than in the state
court, this should make no difference in the decision because, in diversity of citizenship cases, the federal courts must apply the rules of the conflict of laws of the
state in which such courts sit: Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S.
498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481 (1941) ; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 S.
Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481 (1941) ; Clark, "State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins," 55 Yale L. J. 267 (1946) ; Wolkin,
"Conflict of Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era," 94 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 293
(1946).
77 This exception is also subject to federal constitutional limitations such that,
if the forum should act capriciously in the matter, the federal constitution would,
in turn, check the forum in the use of its public policy. See Nutting, "Suggested
Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 19 Minn. L. Rev. 196 (1935) ; Goodrich,
"Foreign Facts and Local Fancies," 25 Va. L. Rev. 26 (1938) ; Beach, "Uniform
Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," 27 Yale L. J. 656 (1918).
78 The case of Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F. (2d) 550 (1941), cert. den. 313 U. S.
498, 61 S. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1841 (1941), presents the idea that a federal court
would be bound by the public policy of the state where the court sat and in which
the remedy was sought. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Eaack, 50 F. Supp.
55 (1943).
79 Insurance Commissioner of Penn. v. Griffiths, 23 N. J. Misc. 96, 41 A. (2d)
386 (1945).
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the place of performance is the dominant factor in the spatial contacts of the transaction, the court may decide to use the law of that
place to govern the contract. 80 Other courts look to the law of the
place of the most substantial contacts of the transaction to govern
the contractual relation s ' so the diverse laws of different places
may come to have some contact with some one or more elements
of the transaction. The question arises, however, as to which of
these contacts is the most essential, vital, or dominant of the
several involved and which, therefore, may be indicative of the
intention of the parties in the case. This process may be described as one of balancing the factors; or, in other words, of
trying to determine which essential element of the contract has
the most important contacts and with what place. The factors
themselves, of course, are the different items of the transaction
that touch, by the parties' activities, the several places in the
negotiation and the closing of the contract obligation.82
It would now seem both necessary and appropriate to make
a few general comments on the aspects of the "intent" theory as
the governing law in insurance contracts. Is it possible to control
the law of insurance contracts by the intent of the parties ? What
are its limitations7 We have observed that certain state statutes
have their effect on the governing law of the contract. When
these statutes are read into the agreement by the forum they
may not be avoided. 3 We may observe that public policy will,
in turn, affect the governing law. We have observed that some
courts endeavor to ascertain either the law of the place of making,
the law of the place of performance, or that of the place having the
most substantial connection with the contract, and then use the
law of one of these spatial contacts to govern the contract.
80 Perhaps the case of Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 155
N. E. 749 (1927), is a good example of this. See also Annis v. Pilkowitz, 287 Mich.
68, 282 N. W. 905 (1938). But see Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Carlson, 126
F. (2d) 607 (1942), and Shane v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 151
(1942), affirmed in 132 F. (2d) 544 (1942).
81 Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N. Y. Supp. 4 (1936).
82 Compania T. Centro Americana, S. A. v. Alliance Assurance Co., 50 F. Supp.
986 (1943) ; United Service Life Ins. Co. v. Farr, 60 F. Supp. 829 (1945).
83 See Fallon, "Conflict Theories and Life Insurance Settlements," (1951) Ins.
L. J. 22; Fallon, "Conflict of Laws in Insurance," 1 J. Am. Soc. Chart. Underwriters
344 (1947).
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Insurance, by its very nature, grew up as a local matter but,
with the growth of the country, it expanded to national dimensions.
Nevertheless, it is still often thought of in terms of "localization,"
particularly so when we speak of the place where the contract was
made, where it was to be performed, where it was to be serviced,
and the like. Possibly, therefore, these "localizing" effects still
cling to the courts, causing their hesitancy in allowing that freedom of contract which some authorities think desirable. 4 Logically, insurance contracts must not be forced to stand still when
many phases of business enterprise seek broader perspective.
Why, then, should insurance contracts be delimited in the freedom
of the choice of law; are they so delimited; and, if so, by what
means and under what theory?
2.

Stipulations as to Governing Law

Before proceeding, attention might well be given to some general language that has been used, albeit not in insurance cases,
for the light such language may shed. In Owen v. HagenbeckWallace Shows Company,5 a Rhode Island court said that the
right of the parties to a contract to have their reciprocal duties
and obligations under that contract governed by the law of some
particular jurisdiction is "limited to the selection as stipulated
by them of the law of a jurisdiction which has a real relation to
the contract. ' 86 By contrast, in the English case of Vita Food
Products Company, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Company,8 7 Lord
Wright stated that "the express words" of the bill of lading beRabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 412-5. See also comment in 10 La. L. Rev. 346.
85 58 R. I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937).
86 58 R. I. 162 at 174, 192 A. 158 at 164. As to whether there is any difference
84

between a stipulation by the parties as to the governing law and the incorporation
of the text of that law within the contract, see Morris, "The Eclipse of the Lem
Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 505. The author indicates
that any purported distinction between the cases on this ground is "nebulous." He
argues that it should make no difference whether a party relies on a foreign law
as such or on a contractual clause which would be valid by that law. From this
suggestion, it might appear that the distinction made by Judge Learned Hand in
the case cited at note 60, ante, between stipulations by the parties as to the overall
governing law of the contract and having the foreign law, embraced within the
terms of the contract is somewhat nebulous also.
87 [1939] A. C. 277.
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fore the court had to receive effect, with the result that the contract was governed by English law, saying that it "is difficult to
see what qualifications are possible; provided the intention is
bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding
the choice on the ground of public policy." He added that connection "with English law is not as a matter of principle essential.' ,8s
After so stating, the court proceeded to apply English law to a
Nova Scotia contract to ship goods from Newfoundland to New
York.
Now compare these statements and holdings with the holdings
achieved in two insurance cases. In one of them, that of Cravens
v. New York Life Insurance Company, 9 the Missouri court found
that to give effect to a stipulation for resort to New York law
would defeat the operation of a local statute of the forum providing for the issuance of extended insurance in the event of default
in the payment of premiums, a statute which had obviously been
enacted to prevent anyone from taking advantage of a person in
an economically weak bargaining position. 90 In the other, that
of Griesemer v. Mutual Life Insurance Company,9 the State of
Washington apparently had no statute requiring that extended
policies of insurance should be issued whenever the main policy
was forfeited for the non-payment of premiums, so the court
permitted a stipulation for the application of the law of New York
to stand. 2
Let us pause here and glance at these four cases and see what
the courts were doing with regard to the parties' choice of law.
The first two were selected because they were not insurance cases
88 Ibid., at pp. 289-90.
89148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519 (1898), affirmed in 178 U. S. 389, 20 S. Ct. 962, 44
L. Ed. 1116 (1900).
90 In the cases of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mullan, 107 Md. 457, 69 A. 385 (1908),
and Dolan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc., 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398 (1899),
the courts struck down agreements for the application of the laws of other states,
when, to sustain them, would enable the parties to evade the statutes of the
insured's domicile which provided that only misrepresentations willfully and fraudulently made, or which were material to the risk, should invalidate the policy.
9110 Wash. 202, 38 P. 1031 (1894).
92 The effect of this decision was to permit the insured to recover, for the New
York law stated that a policy could not be forfeited for non-payment of premiums
unless written notice had been given the insured, and this had not been done.
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in order to contrast them with the other two which were. Is there
a common policy underlying the scheme of the court decisions in
these cases? If so, what is it?
All four courts would appear to be interested in upholding
the stipulation of the parties provided they have complied with
certain requirements. They must, at the outset, meet the test of
''good faith,''98 for that is all the courts mean when they say that
there must not be any intentional evasion, the stipulation must be
bona fide, and must be legal. Why are courts so interested in
"good faith"? Courts are instruments of justice in our social
structure. As instruments of justice, the courts are always interested in protecting the weak and the oppressed from the wiles
of the "schemers" who, often because of strong economic means,
are in a much more favorable bargaining position than are those
with whom they bargain. In essence, therefore, the terms "legal,"
"bona fide," "non-intentional evasion," or similar terms used by
courts in their decisions, are equivalent to economic equations.
There must be balance in any mathematical equation; why should
there not be an equal balance in the human equation?
When there is no balance in the conflict-of-laws contract equation there can be no real freedom of contract. To permit the
parties intentionally to evade the laws having a vital connection
with the contract, the courts reason, would amount to dis-equilibrium in the human contract equation. But, if the courts are only
interested in seeking a balance in the contract, so that no one will
be unjustly oppressed economically, why play upon words that,
to the ordinary layman, and to many professional men as well,
are at best puzzling and at worst deceptive? Why talk of balancing factors in summing up contact points of the elements of the
contract? Are there not means at hand for courts to suppress
coercive contracts other than by delimiting the freedom of the
parties to contract through such steps as those illustrated in these
cases? These means are not peculiar to contract law; they exist
in all forms of law and in all legal systems. The courts would,
93 See Part I hereof, 36 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 34-59, particularly notes 79-84,
and comment in 10 La. L. Rev. 346, together with the cases there cited.
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therefore, be better advised to use these legal tools rather than
placing confusing terms in case decisions that can mean many
things to as many different readers.
Go back to the Owens case 4 once more. The employment contract which was there to be interpreted by the court had been made
in Indiana by a circus company which maintained its winter headquarters in Indiana, and which gave its permanent address as
Chicago, Illinois. The contract provided that the agreement
should be "localized" in Sarasota, Florida, the headquarters for
several circus companies, and indicated that the contract should
be governed by Florida law. The plaintiff-employee was given
written notice of discharge in Massachusetts and he was dismissed there. Suit was brought in Rhode Island, where the company happened to be on a routine performance. In its rejection
of Florida reference law, the Rhode Island court stated that
Florida had no real connection with the contract. Instead, the
court held that Indiana law, being the law of the place of making,
should govern but, as the nature of the law of that state had not
been established, it had to be eliminated. Nothing was said about
Massachusetts law. Therefore, the Rhode Island court used its
own law, which had absolutely no connection with the contract
other than that it happened, by accident, to be the forum, even
though the parties themselves had stipulated for the use of Florida
law. What reason could the court adduce for such action? Rhode
Island law had no relation to the contract or to any of its essential
elements. On the other hand, Florida did have a subjective relation for people of the circus world, it being the headquarters for
a good many of them. It could be assumed that the laws of
Florida would, therefore, be known to the parties to the contract.
But the Florida law would permit the plaintiff-employee to be
dismissed practically at the defendant's pleasure. The court,
therefore, feared "economic coercion" would be the result if it
permitted Florida law to govern. If there was evidence of undue
influence, coercion, or the like, did not the court have at hand other
94

Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R. I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937).
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and sufficient remedies to strike down the agreement?
strain for a result?

Then why

Mention has been made of two insurance cases in which certain of the conflict of laws principles were applied. One case may
serve to illustrate the rule as to statutory interpolation. In Jones
v. PrudentialInsurance Company,95 the court found that the local
statutes of the forum could not be read into the contract when the
policy, providing for disability benefits, had been executed and
delivered in another state, even though, following that event, the
insured had become a citizen of the forum state and had suffered
his disability there.
If the place of performance is, or can be said to be, a dominant
factor, the court may decide to use the law of that place in preference to that of the place of making. Thus, in Ostroff v. New York
Life Insurance Company,9 6 a New York company issued a life
insurance policy to the plaintiffs, being the insured and the beneficiaries thereunder, in California where the policy was delivered
by the defendant. The question in the case turned on fraud in
the procurement of the policy. In California, the policy would
have been incontestable for lapse of time. In New York, the incontestability clause would not have precluded the defense. A
federal court sitting in California proceeded to state that, normally, the law of the place of delivery would govern the contract
in cases of this nature since delivery was the final act needed to
complete the contract. But, said the court, here all the premiums
as well as the benefits were to be paid at the home office in New
York with the parties expressly agreeing that New York law
should govern. Noting that the payment of premiums, being the
consideration for the policy, and the payment of benefits, being
the obligation to be performed by the defendant upon the happening of certain contingencies, would constitute the performance of
the contract, the court found that, under the agreement of the
95 210 S. C. 264, 42 S. E. 331 (1947).
96 23 F. Supp. 724 (1938).
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parties, these performances were to take place in New York.
Then, said the court:
These clauses take the policy of insurance out of the general
rule which calls for the application of the law of the state
where the policy is delivered. They are specific provisions
calling for performance at a particular place . . . Courts
have applied, without deviation, the law of the place of performance where the parties, by their agreement, have designated a special place of performance . . . Public policy is
not violated even by a specific provision making the law of
another state or of a foreign country applicable to a policy of
insurance . . . The courts of New York have ruled that incontestability clauses of this type do not preclude a contest
upon the ground of fraud after the expiration of the contestable period . . . Hence a conflict exists between New York
and California law. And we are bound to apply the law of
7
New York.1
The case illustrates an attitude on the part of courts to give application to the agreed stipulations of the parties to a contract
as well as an indication that such stipulations will be honored
provided they are not contrary to public policy and have a reasonable connection with some place whose law is chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual relations.
This view would be the one which it could be expected would
be applied in the absence of an express statutory declaration of
a contrary public policy on the part of the forum. In Boole v.
Union Marine Insurance Compainy,9 for example, the insured
sought to recover under two policies of marine insurance, issued
by defendant, covering chartered freight on his barges which sank
in San Francisco Bay. The court found that the policies of insurance provided that all claims for loss should be adjusted according
to the English law and practice, and that the settlement thereof
should be made in conformity with the laws and customs of
97 23 F. Supp. 724 at 726.

9852 Cal. App. 207, 198 P. 416 (1921).
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England. The insured had contended that these stipulations did
not, either expressly or by implication, exclude the California
Code provisions as to what should constitute a constructive total
loss but that, rather, claims under the policies were to be settled
in accordance with the laws and customs of England only when
such laws and customs were not in conflict with California provisions which, he contended, were part of the insurance contracts.
If such was not to be the case, the insured then contended that
the settlement clauses were void as being in contravention of the
domestic policy of the state.
Despite these contentions, the court held otherwise on the
ground that contracts of insurance were not different from other
contracts. In that connection, the court said:
In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, insurance companies have the same right as an individual to limit
their liability, and to impose whatever conditions they please
upon their obligations, not inconsistent with public policy
• . . In cases of contract, it is well settled that the parties,
by their own act and will, may agree to be bound by the law
of a foreign jurisdiction, and such law will be enforced in
the forum where the parties reside . . . A contract by an
insurance company made in one state and executed elsewhere
may, by its terms, incorporate the law of another state and
make its provisions controlling upon both the insurer and
insured . . . The general rule is that, in the absence of
statutory prohibitions, the parties may stipulate that the
policy shall be construed and governed by the laws, usages,
and customs of a foreign state, and such laws, usages, and
customs as are applicable shall be deemed to be a part of the
written contract. 99
To much the same effect is the holding in the case of Aluminum
Company of America v. Rulley,' based upon an indemnity contract,
99 52 Cal. App. 207 at 209-10, 198 P. 416 at 417. In addition to the cases there
cited, see also Duskin v. Pennsylvania Cent. Airlines Corp., 167 F. (2d) 727 (1948),
cert. den. 335 U. S. 829, 69 S. Ct. 56, 93 L. Ed. 382 (1948), and Palmer v. Chamberlain, 191 F. (2d) 532 (1951).
1200 F. (2d) 257 (1952).
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where the court pointed out that it was the rule in Iowa that the
parties were free to agree upon the state whose law should govern
the validity, construction, interpretation and effect of their contract 2 and, finding nothing in the contract before it to make the
same illegal or void, directed the trial court to apply the contract "according to the intention of the parties expressed in its
terms." '3 But note, however, that there was a point of contact
between the contract and the State of Pennsylvania, whose law
was used to govern the dispute therein.'
Where the insurance policy is silent on the point as to applicable law, a court might, as it did in the case of Davis v. Aetna
Mutual Fire Insurance Company,' look to all the surrounding circumstances to arrive at what the parties might be presumed to
have intended as the law to govern their contractual relations.
But there is indication, in the case of Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Cohen,6 that a stipulation appearing in the application for
insurance but not in the contract itself would be ineffective for
the court there said that the rights of the parties were to be
"measured alone by the terms of the contract." 7 In the case of
2 The court cited, in support of this position, the cases of Haverly v. Union Construction Company, 236 Iowa 278, 18 N. W. (2d) 629 (1945) ; Gotnam v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 180 Iowa 1141, 162 N. W. 786 (1917) ; Johnson v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 109 Iowa 708, 78 N. W. 905, 50 L. R. A. 99 (1899) ; Goodwin v. Provident Say.
Life Assur. Soc. of New York, 97 Iowa 226, 66 N. W. 157, 32 L. R. A. 473 (1896);
Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867) ; and Butters v. Olds, 11 Iowa 1 (1860).
3 200 F. (2d) 257 at 262.
4 The reader may observe that there is, in the cases referred to, some contact of
the elements of the transaction with the law of the place adopted by the court to
govern the contract. The courts are not always clear upon what basis they formulate the decisions. Are we to take the bare mentioning by the court in its opinion
that the contract was made in such and such a place and then its adoption of the
law of that place as indicative that it used the "most vital and substantial contact"
theory, or may we discount some of the court's "small talk" and accept that which
appeals to our own mind's eye? To be fair, unless some special emphasis is placed
by the court on some particular point, we must weigh all proportionately in the
scales of fair reasoning. If no two men see the same accident in identical ways,
how can two readers see the same printed facts alike? The English language is
full of shades of meaning and is most difficult to use with any degree of exactness.
5 67 N. 11. 218, 34 A. 464 (1892).
6 179 U. S. 262, 21 S. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181 (1900).
7 179 U. S. 262 at 270, 21 S. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181 at 186.
As so qualified, the
decision cannot be said to be one which is opposed to the idea of permitting the
parties to enter into express stipulations provided their understanding is set out
"in the contract." See, In that connection, the case of Baxter v. Brooklyn Life Ins.
Co., 119 N. Y. 450, 23 N. E. 1048, 7 L. R. A. 293 (1890).
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Voorheis v. People's Mutual Benefit Society s however, the expressed stipulations of the parties were upheld in relation to an
application for insurance made in Michigan even though the bylaws, endorsed upon the policy, were to the effect that the application was to have no effect until approved at the principal office
situated in the state whose laws were chosen to govern the
contract.'
Illustrating the protection which may be provided for the
benefit of the insured, deemed to be the weaker of the two bargaining parties, are the holdings to be found in two other conflicts
cases. In Albro v. ManhattanLife Insurance Company,0 the contract of insurance was made in Massachusetts between a resident
of Massachusetts and a foreign insurance company doing business
in that state. It was held that the parties could not stipulate to
avoid a Massachusetts statutory provision which declared a public
policy rule of the state with respect to contracts made there. In
essence, the contract included the local public policy doctrine of
the state as so enunciated, and this policy was invoked to protect
against what the court must have viewed as a degree of "economic
oppression" or "economic coercion."
In the other case, that of Pietri v. Seguenot," the policy
declared that it should be construed in accordance with New York
laws. It was delivered, being the last act necessaxy to complete
the contract, in Missouri, where the insured was then a resident.
Because of the presence of a strong public policy on the part of
Missouri to protect its own residents, and apparently because of
a fear on the part of the court of the possibility of the "economic
oppression" of the weaker of the two contracting parties, the
12
Missouri law was deemed to govern the contract.
Before proceeding to any summary, it might be noted that
8 91 Mich. 469, 51 N. W. 1109 (1892).
9 The explanation for the holding may lie in the fact that there was present a
substantial contact between the law stipulated for and the contract elements.
10 119 F. 629 (1902).
11 96 Mo. App. 258, 69 S. W. 1055 (1902).
12 As the contract was "made" in Missouri, that state might be said to have had
a "substantial" connection with the transaction, so the holding could be justified
on that ground without regard to the rationale adopted in the opinion.
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Professor Rabel is of the opinion that the courts, in insurance
contract cases, are somewhat confused as to the part to be played
by the stipulations of the parties to the contract regarding the
applicable law. 13 Thus, he notes that it has been held in Alabama
that an assignment of a life insurance policy to a person with no
insurable interest in the life of the insured was to be regarded as
validly executed in New York, hence was to be enforced even
against the law of the forum since it comprised nothing inherently bad, but that a contrary view has been expressed in Texas,
with the Supreme Court of the United States recognizing a constitutional freedom in a public policy which protects citizens
against the assumed dangers of insurance on their lives held
by strangers. 4 After so noting, Professor Rabel continues:
In a few instances, courts of this country have disregarded
express contract stipulations determining the place of the
contract and thereby the applicable law. It seems that all
these decisions were rendered in Massachusetts and Missouri.
The latter state has waged a long and gallant legislative
battle, with repeated reverses in the Supreme Court of the
United States, to protect its residents against forfeiture
clauses and other contractual deteriorations of their insurance
in New York companies. Certainly, if an insurance contract
has all the characteristics of a Missouri contract, stipulations
inserted in the policy providing, for example, for a different
rule of computation from that prescribed by the statute or
for waiver or surrender value, forbidden by the statute, would
be recognized as ineffectual at present as it was in 1891 with
the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States. If
in such a case of an insurance contract belonging to the law
of one state, the law of another state is stipulated for, it is a
13 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, Vol. 2, particularly pp. 412,
414 and 577.
14 Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 577, citing Haase v. First Nat. Bank of Anniston, 203
Ala. 624, 84 So. 761 (1919), in contrast with Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F. (2d) 550
(1941). Rabel refers to Morgan, "Choice of Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 153 (1944), at p. 157, note 8, for authority that the "Supreme Court of the
United States had previously recognized the constitutional freedom in 'public policy
which protects citizens against the assumed dangers of insurance on their lives held
by strangers.!"
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question of public policy whether the statutory prohibition
should be maintained nevertheless. A court, then, may qualify the agreements as an ineffectual attempt at evasion within
the sphere of the prohibition. 5
He appears to think that this reasoning may be the basis of some
of the Massachusetts decisions. While he contends that the agreement ought not to be considered void as a whole, he does state
that the
vastly prevailing doctrine respecting insurance contracts is
summarized in the leading encyclopedia to the effect that,
"if the policy or certificate does expressly provide that a specific state shall be the place of contract, the law of the state
agreed upon as governing controls the nature, validity, interpretation, and effect of the contract, whether the specified
state be the state wherein the contract was made, or a foreign
state or country, and notwithstanding the insured resides, or
6
the property is located in another state."
He concludes further that, the above being true, all reasonable
exceptions can be fully explained by the effect given to a specified
public policy.
D.

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS

Usually, in usury, carrier and insurance contracts in which
the parties have expressly stipulated for a law with reasonable
spatial connections to govern their transaction, the courts will
endeavor to uphold the agreement. In arriving at their decisions
where the law has been expressly stipulated by the parties to
govern their agreement, the courts may look to policy determinants not only of the forum but of that place, as seen by the forum,
having the most vital or substantial connections with the transaction. Constitutional limitations must be observed by the forum
in the use of the choice of law to govern the contract lest an unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious use of the choice of law concept
based upon forum concepts of policy determinants may be held
unconstitutional for insufficient spatial contract contacts.
15 Ibid., pp. 412-3.
16 Ibid., pp. 413-5.

Footnotes omitted.

